Cogsci 98/198
Quantum Consciousness Decal
Platonic Coherency
The Platonic world, in recent literature, is presented as the irreducible and
organizational base of the surrounding universe in which mankind lives. It has direct
causal effects on the physical, observable world and affects the mental world, which
in turn observes and analyzes the physical. The Platonic world provides organization
– an underlying and yet seemingly epiphenomenal logical structure of building blocks
that cannot be reduced to nor identically copied. This provides the physical world with
a blueprint to be derived from and provides the mental world with a telos that it tends
towards. Already, this presents a quandary – does the world supervene on the Platonic or
do the physical and mental worlds strive to become the Platonic?
Prima facie, the Platonic world could be considered as a quick-fix to the
seemingly endless waterfall of matter that is ontological reductionism and as perhaps not
a cause, but a goal, of causation. It provides an elegant design for non-computation (thus
solving Godel’s problem as applied to the mind) and necessitates the epiphenomenalism
of numbers and mathematical logic. The platonic world might, however, simply be an
explanatory device –not ontologically or causally realizable (and thus unobservable)
and not subject to human intelligence. Consider two solutions to dualism – Searle’s
biological naturalism and the proposal that minds are the product of biological quantum
computation (which are in regards to the Platonic world, essentially, the same solution).
They neatly ties up the conflict between the mental and physical but requires some kind
of organizing super-feature.
There are three ways to approach the Platonic world that can be considered in
this essay – Jung from human experience, Penrose from the elegance of mathematics
and an all--encompassing theory of order from Bohm. In each approach, the Platonic
world provides unity, a telos and yet also a building block to reduce to. The Platonic
world maybe be a “quick-fix” because the current view of the physical and mental world
requires an organizational feature that is not causal but has a tendency to avoid entropic
disarray and cis also irreducible. It’s a dualistic answer to a question of dualism – how
are the mental and physical coherent? They are coherent if there is an order to ensure
that the physical does not dissociates entirely as per the second law of thermodynamics
(the teleological function) and if there is an order to the mental to be mind qua mind
(irreducible).
Jung proposes that the Collective Unconscious is a hereditary set of forms
contained within the mental states of humans . Colloquial speech synonymously defines
archetypes as tropes. Consider the “damsel in distress” trope or the anima/animus . They
appear to be predetermined categories that humans or human behavior falls naturally
into. Jung calls archetypes a “pre-existent form”. He proposes that it has a secondary
quality to it such that these forms are not simply categories but also give form to mental
content. The previous definition of predetermined categories is not strong enough to
encompass archetypes – they are forms, practically molds for an untouched mental
content to be shaped and thus be made conscious. Freudian psychology, as an account for
human action, is unsatisfactory as it accounts for causation primarily through personal
means. A priori causation, Jung asserts, cannot be disregarded and these a priori causes
are universal instincts like the instinct to eat or sleep or cry out to help. The latter, as an
example, is associated with the archetype of the damsel in distress and these instincts
form universal patterns.
Penrose’s Platonic World is of a more classical strand that concerns absolutes.
It suggests that mathematical laws are epiphenomenal and casually affect the physical
world. The elegance of math and the physical world meet in shockingly accurate ways
– from Euclidean geometry to general and special relativity, mathematical suggestions
“meet” the observable and physical universe. That is, Euclid and Einstein didn’t fit the
math to the world, but rather the equations that appear to govern the world appear to be
results of elegant mathematics and logic. This suggests to Penrose, and to many other
mathematicians, that there is a sense of mathematical truth – axioms that are “purer” than
derived models. This world of absolutes – the Platonic World of Mathematical Forms,
as Penrose terms it, is epiphenomenal, objective and unable to be completely represented
in the physical world. The existence of these purer objects led Penrose to suggest his
triworld theory. He proposes a tri-fold schematic that includes the Platonic world of
forms (both mathematical and containing forms like beauty and truth), the Physical world
and the Mental world.
The three distinctions are important to his general case in that the division speaks
to a fairly typical world view – that everything in our world can be divided into the
qualitative, the quantitative and the measurement of the two (ie. the quantities and the
qualities for which the rest of matter is subjected to). The physical is the quantitative
– the tangible, ontologically affirmable matter of the universe. The mental world is
the qualitative – connected to the physical world non–causally in that the physical
world is not derived from the mental but is encompassed within it as to facilitate human
understanding. There are qualities to what can be quantified and also qualities to what
can not be qualified. The Platonic world, in this view, is the “measurement device”
of sorts. It is the containers of qualities and quantities to be sorted into – intrinsic,
indivisible and structurally inherent to the universe.
Professor Searle’s line of thinking to introduce theory of biological naturalism
(roughly that consciousness is a higher-order function of neurobiology in the same way
that photosynthesis supervenes on chlorophyll and photons, and solidity supervenes on
molecular structure) suggests an epistemic quandary with regards to Penrose’s division.
The Platonic world, as previously discussed, introduces yet another category into the
ontological – if not accountable -– universe. Would this be necessary if qualitative and
quantitative forms are not categories of truths for all else to be reduced to but instead
are identical to the matter that they appear to make up. In the traditional view (Penrose)
Adonis would be the physical manifestation of the Platonic form of beauty. According to
the latter suggestion, Adonis would not be the manifestation of beauty but would simply
be beauty in the same way that Adonis is Adonis, identity qua identity.
David Bohm introduces the “Implicate Order” as a response to queries about the
completeness of the universe. Why does an observer see reality as a continuous stream
of consciousness while the universe appears to take place a “still” life, in flashes? From
this, is the observer different from the observed? Why is the observer’s consciousness
not considered as discrete flashes? He essentially rewords the dualistic problem which
implies that his answer must provide coherency. Bohm suggests that there is an inherent
wholeness that humans have in order to fight entropic change and provide unity. This
Implicate Order is an overarching connection of basic elements which gives a set of
cosmic “rules”. These rules can be considered to be a part of Penrose’s Platonic World.
The concept of a “stream of consciousness” and the incoherence with snapshots
of time is prevalent in modernist literature – Joyce, Woolf, Faulkner and Eliot all provide
literary analogues to a suggestion from Bohm, that order is required for humans to “fight”
our endlessly entropic world but also that order is a construct of human imagination.
Eliot in particular, as suggested from modernist-to-the-point-of-absurdist poem The
Wastelands would most likely argue that the “top” function of the Platonic world – the
teleological function is entirely constructed. The modernists would certainly have doubts
about the reality of an implicate order.
The Platonic world seems like a bandage, of sorts, to cover up remaining holes
of coherency in the current world view. Descartes’ god has a teleological and irreducible
function but that god was also the bandage to his Ontological Proof in the same way that
the Platonic World appears to be to our method of coherency.
References:
Roger Penrose, Stuart Hameroff “Consciousness in the Universe: Neuroscience,
Quantum Space-Time Geometry and Orch OR Theory” Journal of Cosmology 2004
(access through bSpace)
Jung, Carl. "The Collective Unconscious." Bahai Studies (Google Scholar). N.p., n.d.
Web. 3 Dec. 2013. <http://www.bahaistudies.net/asma/The-Concept-of-the-Collective-
Unconscious.pdf>.
Penrose, Roger. The road to reality: a complete guide to the laws of the universe. New
York: A.A. Knopf, 2005. Print.
Russell, Bertrand. A history of western philosophy. New York, N.Y.: Simon and
Schuster, 1972. Print.
Quantum Consciousness Decal
Platonic Coherency
The Platonic world, in recent literature, is presented as the irreducible and
organizational base of the surrounding universe in which mankind lives. It has direct
causal effects on the physical, observable world and affects the mental world, which
in turn observes and analyzes the physical. The Platonic world provides organization
– an underlying and yet seemingly epiphenomenal logical structure of building blocks
that cannot be reduced to nor identically copied. This provides the physical world with
a blueprint to be derived from and provides the mental world with a telos that it tends
towards. Already, this presents a quandary – does the world supervene on the Platonic or
do the physical and mental worlds strive to become the Platonic?
Prima facie, the Platonic world could be considered as a quick-fix to the
seemingly endless waterfall of matter that is ontological reductionism and as perhaps not
a cause, but a goal, of causation. It provides an elegant design for non-computation (thus
solving Godel’s problem as applied to the mind) and necessitates the epiphenomenalism
of numbers and mathematical logic. The platonic world might, however, simply be an
explanatory device –not ontologically or causally realizable (and thus unobservable)
and not subject to human intelligence. Consider two solutions to dualism – Searle’s
biological naturalism and the proposal that minds are the product of biological quantum
computation (which are in regards to the Platonic world, essentially, the same solution).
They neatly ties up the conflict between the mental and physical but requires some kind
of organizing super-feature.
There are three ways to approach the Platonic world that can be considered in
this essay – Jung from human experience, Penrose from the elegance of mathematics
and an all--encompassing theory of order from Bohm. In each approach, the Platonic
world provides unity, a telos and yet also a building block to reduce to. The Platonic
world maybe be a “quick-fix” because the current view of the physical and mental world
requires an organizational feature that is not causal but has a tendency to avoid entropic
disarray and cis also irreducible. It’s a dualistic answer to a question of dualism – how
are the mental and physical coherent? They are coherent if there is an order to ensure
that the physical does not dissociates entirely as per the second law of thermodynamics
(the teleological function) and if there is an order to the mental to be mind qua mind
(irreducible).
Jung proposes that the Collective Unconscious is a hereditary set of forms
contained within the mental states of humans . Colloquial speech synonymously defines
archetypes as tropes. Consider the “damsel in distress” trope or the anima/animus . They
appear to be predetermined categories that humans or human behavior falls naturally
into. Jung calls archetypes a “pre-existent form”. He proposes that it has a secondary
quality to it such that these forms are not simply categories but also give form to mental
content. The previous definition of predetermined categories is not strong enough to
encompass archetypes – they are forms, practically molds for an untouched mental
content to be shaped and thus be made conscious. Freudian psychology, as an account for
human action, is unsatisfactory as it accounts for causation primarily through personal
means. A priori causation, Jung asserts, cannot be disregarded and these a priori causes
are universal instincts like the instinct to eat or sleep or cry out to help. The latter, as an
example, is associated with the archetype of the damsel in distress and these instincts
form universal patterns.
Penrose’s Platonic World is of a more classical strand that concerns absolutes.
It suggests that mathematical laws are epiphenomenal and casually affect the physical
world. The elegance of math and the physical world meet in shockingly accurate ways
– from Euclidean geometry to general and special relativity, mathematical suggestions
“meet” the observable and physical universe. That is, Euclid and Einstein didn’t fit the
math to the world, but rather the equations that appear to govern the world appear to be
results of elegant mathematics and logic. This suggests to Penrose, and to many other
mathematicians, that there is a sense of mathematical truth – axioms that are “purer” than
derived models. This world of absolutes – the Platonic World of Mathematical Forms,
as Penrose terms it, is epiphenomenal, objective and unable to be completely represented
in the physical world. The existence of these purer objects led Penrose to suggest his
triworld theory. He proposes a tri-fold schematic that includes the Platonic world of
forms (both mathematical and containing forms like beauty and truth), the Physical world
and the Mental world.
The three distinctions are important to his general case in that the division speaks
to a fairly typical world view – that everything in our world can be divided into the
qualitative, the quantitative and the measurement of the two (ie. the quantities and the
qualities for which the rest of matter is subjected to). The physical is the quantitative
– the tangible, ontologically affirmable matter of the universe. The mental world is
the qualitative – connected to the physical world non–causally in that the physical
world is not derived from the mental but is encompassed within it as to facilitate human
understanding. There are qualities to what can be quantified and also qualities to what
can not be qualified. The Platonic world, in this view, is the “measurement device”
of sorts. It is the containers of qualities and quantities to be sorted into – intrinsic,
indivisible and structurally inherent to the universe.
Professor Searle’s line of thinking to introduce theory of biological naturalism
(roughly that consciousness is a higher-order function of neurobiology in the same way
that photosynthesis supervenes on chlorophyll and photons, and solidity supervenes on
molecular structure) suggests an epistemic quandary with regards to Penrose’s division.
The Platonic world, as previously discussed, introduces yet another category into the
ontological – if not accountable -– universe. Would this be necessary if qualitative and
quantitative forms are not categories of truths for all else to be reduced to but instead
are identical to the matter that they appear to make up. In the traditional view (Penrose)
Adonis would be the physical manifestation of the Platonic form of beauty. According to
the latter suggestion, Adonis would not be the manifestation of beauty but would simply
be beauty in the same way that Adonis is Adonis, identity qua identity.
David Bohm introduces the “Implicate Order” as a response to queries about the
completeness of the universe. Why does an observer see reality as a continuous stream
of consciousness while the universe appears to take place a “still” life, in flashes? From
this, is the observer different from the observed? Why is the observer’s consciousness
not considered as discrete flashes? He essentially rewords the dualistic problem which
implies that his answer must provide coherency. Bohm suggests that there is an inherent
wholeness that humans have in order to fight entropic change and provide unity. This
Implicate Order is an overarching connection of basic elements which gives a set of
cosmic “rules”. These rules can be considered to be a part of Penrose’s Platonic World.
The concept of a “stream of consciousness” and the incoherence with snapshots
of time is prevalent in modernist literature – Joyce, Woolf, Faulkner and Eliot all provide
literary analogues to a suggestion from Bohm, that order is required for humans to “fight”
our endlessly entropic world but also that order is a construct of human imagination.
Eliot in particular, as suggested from modernist-to-the-point-of-absurdist poem The
Wastelands would most likely argue that the “top” function of the Platonic world – the
teleological function is entirely constructed. The modernists would certainly have doubts
about the reality of an implicate order.
The Platonic world seems like a bandage, of sorts, to cover up remaining holes
of coherency in the current world view. Descartes’ god has a teleological and irreducible
function but that god was also the bandage to his Ontological Proof in the same way that
the Platonic World appears to be to our method of coherency.
References:
Roger Penrose, Stuart Hameroff “Consciousness in the Universe: Neuroscience,
Quantum Space-Time Geometry and Orch OR Theory” Journal of Cosmology 2004
(access through bSpace)
Jung, Carl. "The Collective Unconscious." Bahai Studies (Google Scholar). N.p., n.d.
Web. 3 Dec. 2013. <http://www.bahaistudies.net/asma/The-Concept-of-the-Collective-
Unconscious.pdf>.
Penrose, Roger. The road to reality: a complete guide to the laws of the universe. New
York: A.A. Knopf, 2005. Print.
Russell, Bertrand. A history of western philosophy. New York, N.Y.: Simon and
Schuster, 1972. Print.
